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Market  structure has  implications  for research policies.  The public  sector reduced  its support
for technological  change for poultry  relative to beef and pork after poultry became  integrated.
However,  market integration  causes private  sector research  to  be below the optimal  level  from
society's perspective.  In order  to get the  appropriate response  from the private  sector,  the
public  sector should not reduce  its  support for technological  change  after market integration.
Instead,  the public  sector  should  increase its  support for research  such as basic science  that
complements  private  sector research.
Current trends  affecting the structure of agriculture  tance of farming  in the  overall  agricultural  sector
include increasing consolidation  of farms  and ver-  declines,  the  share  of public  sector research  may
tical  integration  among  the  market  stages.  Farm  continue to  decline.  Public  and  private sector ex-
numbers  declined  by  30,000 per  year  during  the  penditures  for  agricultural  research  were  both  at
mid-1980's,  continuing  the  trend  towards  fewer  about  the  same  level  in  1950,  but  private  sector
and  larger  farms.  Increased  vertical  coordination  expenditures  have grown much  more rapidly  than
results from processors  contracting with producers  public  sector  expenditures  since  then  (Huffman
and operating  production facilities  in order to bet-  and Evenson).  In  1990 private  sector expenditures
ter meet the demands  of discriminating consumers  for agricultural research were almost double public
(Council  on  Food,  Agricultural,  and  Resource  sector  expenditures.  With  the industrialization  of
Economics).  With  the increased  use of purchased  agriculture,  the  private  sector  will  play  a  greater
inputs such as pesticides  by farmers and increased  role in funding  agricultural  research.
processing of food products, the agribusiness share  Secondly,  the  industrialization  of  agriculture
of the consumers'  food dollar has increased,  while  will  change  the  research  mix.  The  public  sector
the farm  share has  declined.  Smith estimated that  spends  more than the private  sector in crop breed-
the share of agricultural sales contributed by farm-  ing and management and in nutrition and livestock
ing dropped from 21  to 5  percent during this  cen-  (Pray  and  Neumeyer).  The private  sector  spends
tury.  The  process  of farm  consolidation,  vertical  more  than  the  public  sector  on  mechanization,
coordination,  and  expansion  of  agribusiness  con-  chemicals,  and  post  harvest  research.  Develop-
tributions  relative  to those  of farming  can be de-  ments  in biotechnology  have  increased  incentives
scribed  as the industrialization of agriculture. This  for the private sector to conduct research related to
process  of  industrialization  has  implications  for  production  agriculture.  The environment  for  pri-
technological  change.  vate  sector  research has  also improved  as  a result
First,  the relative  importance of public and  pri-  of greater protection for intellectual  property rights
vate research  will likely change  as  a result of the  (Centner  and  White).  The private  sector can now
industrialization of agriculture.  Public research has  capture many of the benefits of improved plant and
traditionally emphasized farm production in which  animal varieties,  which  has  spurred private  sector
the benefits  from the research are widely dispersed  investments in these  areas.  Huffman  and Evenson
and  not  easily  captured  by  those  conducting  the  believe that,  in the future,  the role of the private
research.  Benefits  from  public  agricultural  re-  sector  in  research  will continue  to broaden  while
search  such as abundant  supplies  and lower prices  the  public  sector  will  concentrate  on  pilot inven-
have  accrued largely  to society  as  a whole  rather  tions and pre-technology  science that facilitate and
than to  individual  farmers.  As the relative impor-  enhance  private  sector research.
The objective  of this paper  is to  examine  how
the integration of agriculture  affects the magnitude
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production is rapidly becoming integrated.  Poultry  poultry and livestock shows how  the public sector
experienced  a reduction  in  public  support  for re-  has responded to changes in market structure.  Cash
search  relative to beef and pork as it became  inte-  receipts  and  research  expenditures  for  beef, pork
grated.  Secondly,  a market model  is developed  to  and poultry  are reported  in Table  1. Cash receipts
explain  the  economics  of  technological  change.  and  research  expenditures  reported  here  were  de-
The decision making processes for both the public  flated using the GNP implicit price deflator with a
sector  and  private  sector  are  examined.  Applica-  1984  base.  The research  intensity  variable  in this
tion  of  the  comparative  statics  model  shows  the  table  is the ratio  of research  expenditures  to  cash
impact  of  market  integration  on  technological  receipts  converted  to  a percentage  term.  Poultry
change for the public and  private sectors.  had the highest research intensity in  1969,  but be-
tween  1969  and  1991,  a period  in which  poultry
became fully integrated,  there was little change  in
Livestock  and Poultry Research  poultry's  research  intensity.  While  poultry's  re-
search  intensity  increased  only  39%,  research  in-
This section examines  the impact of integration  in  tensity  doubled for beef and  tripled for pork.
poultry on research  expenditures in the public sec-  During  the  1969-91  period,  the real  value  of
tor.  Poultry  production  is already  controlled  by  a  cash receipts dropped more  for beef and pork than
few  large contractors  with  no  independent  access  for  poultry.  However  the real  value  of  research
to  the  market  by  small  or  medium  growers  expenditures  for  the same  period increased  much
(USDA,  A  Time  to  Choose: Summary Report on  more for beef and pork than for poultry.  Research
the Structure ofAgriculture). Livestock production  expenditures in 1991  were 28% higher for poultry,
is  moving  more  rapidly  toward  industrialization  79%  higher  for  beef,  and  103%  higher  for  pork
than  grains  (Council  on  Food,  Agricultural,  and  than  1969  levels.  The public  sector's commitment
Resource  Economics).  In particular,  hog produc-  to research  in poultry as an integrated industry  ap-
tion  is  shifting  to  fewer  and  larger  farms  with  pears to have fallen in a relative sense as compared
closer ties to pork processors (Barkema and Cook).  to beef and pork, which were not integrated during
Significant economies of size in selling and pro-  this period.
cessing  poultry  led  to  high  concentration  at  the
first-handler  level  (USDA,  A  Time  to  Choose:
Summary Report on the Structure of Agriculture).  Analytical Framework
In turn,  processors  of poultry  increased  coordina-
tion through contracts and integration.  Broilers  are  This  section  of  the  paper  develops  an  analytical
produced under contracts,  while turkey production  framework for optimal  technological change  as fi-
has been integrated.  Feed suppliers integrated  for-  nanced by  the public  and  private  sectors.  First,  a
ward  into  production  and  processing  in  order  to  comparative  statics  model of an  agricultural prod-
fully utilize their production  capacity.  Thus poul-  uct is developed.  The production process includes
try has been  industrialized.  production inputs and manufacturing inputs. Tech-
An  examination  of research  funding  trends  for  nological change can occur in both production and
Table 1.  Comparison of Public  Research Expenditures for Livestock  and Poultrya
Categories  Units  Beef  Pork  Poultry
1969
Research  Expenditures
b Mil$  77.4  34.5  54.7
Cash Receipts'  Bil$  34.0  12.8  11.8
Research  Intensity  %  .22  .26  .46
1991
Research  Expendituresd  Mil$  138.8  69.9  70.0
Cash  Receipts'  Bil$  30.8  8.6  10.9
Research  Intensity  %  .45  .81  .64
1969-91  Growth
Research  Expenditures  %  79.3  102.6  28.0
Cash Receipts  %  -9.4  -32.8  -7.6
aConstant dollars using GNP  implicit price  deflator  (1984  =  100)
bSource:  Huffman  and Evenson
cSource: USDA,  ERS,  Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector
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manufacturing.  It is assumed that the public sector  facturing  inputs  are  shown  by  equations  (7)  and
finances  technological  change  in  production  and  (8),  respectively.  New technology that reduces the
the private sector finances technological  change in  cost of the input is given by T1 for livestock and T2
manufacturing.  Secondly,  changes  in  economic  for manufactured  inputs.
surpluses  resulting from technological  change  are  Totally  differentiating  the  system  of equations
quantified.  Thirdly,  the optimal  levels  of techno-  (3)  through (8)  and converting to elasticities  shows
logical  change financed  by  the public  and  private  how  technological  change  affects  the  industry
sectors  are  derived,  equilibrium:
Competitive Equilibrium  (9)  0  =  Tr
(10)  p  =  kli 1 +  k2vi2
A comparative statics model of a competitive mar-  (11)  x1 =  - k2Cwl  +  k2 Acn2  +  0
ket for  one  product and  two  inputs  is developed.  (12) 12 =  klw' 1 - kw^ 2 +  q
This  framework  follows  Diewert's  work,  which  (13)  wi  =  (l/E),x  +  Yi
gave  explicit  consideration  to factor  markets  and  (14)  w2  =  (1/E2) 2 +  Y2
production technology.  Within this framework it is
possible  to measure  the  impacts  of technological  where  ^over a variable  indicates relative change (a possible to measure the impacts of technological
change.  Mullen, Wohlgenant,  and Farris applied a  =  d log a  = da/a),  - is the own price elasticity of
related  model to the  U.S. beef market.  demand,  k i is  the  input  share  of total  cost  (k,  is
Livestock  and  manufacturing  inputs  are  com-  livestock production as a share of total cost and  k2
bined to produce fresh and processed meat. A gen-  i  manufacturing  as a  share  of total cost),  is the
ieral  representation  of  thi  productio  process  is  elasticity of substitution between the two inputs, Ei eral  representation  of  this  production  process  is
given  by  rpeettooftiprdcinpoe  is  the input supply  elasticity,  and  yi  is the relative
price change resulting from technological  change.
(1)  q  = f(xl, x2)  The shift in the supply of inputs (yi) is proportional
to  a  shift  in input  demand  resulting  form  biased where  q  is the  final  meat product,  x,  is the  live-  i  i  in  n  n  '  . . . technical  change  (Mullen,  Wohlgenant,  and  Far- stock input, and x2 is the manufacturing  input. The  i 
industry  cost  function  related  to  this  production  risThe system of equations  (9) through (14) can be function  can be represented  as solved  by  forming the  Jacobian  matrix,  which  is
(2)  C  =  H(wj,  w2)q  the matrix of partial  derivatives of the endogenous
variables.  Analytically  inverting  the  Jacobian ma-
where  C  is  total  cost,  w,  is  the  input  price  for  trix and post multiplying it by the vector of exog-
livestock and w2 is the input price for manufactur-  enous shifters (0002Yy2)'  yields the following  so-
ing inputs.  By assuming constant  returns to scale,  lutions
the cost function is separable between input prices
and output.
Each  livestock  market  can  be  described  by  a  (15)  q  =  ql' 1 + q2 2
system of equations depicting  supply  and demand  +  r  ))E/D]  +  cr)E 2 /D]y 2 relationships:  (16)  +  2 (16)  p  =  p,,  +  P - 22
(3)  q  =  q(p)  Product Demand  =[-kl(e 2 +  or)e/D]yl  +  [-k2(e 1 - o')E 2 /D]y 2 (4) p  =  H(w,,  w2)  Price Equals  Marginal
Cost  (17)  x1 =  x 11'Y 1 +  12y2
(5)  xl  =  h,(w1, w2)q  Factor Demand  [(k2Ue2 - kre 2 - ^)E/D]y
(6)  x2 =  h2(w1,  w2)q  Factor Demand  +  [-k 2(c  +  rTI)EIE/D]y 2
(7)  w1 =  wl(xl,  T1)  Inverse Factor Supply  (1)  x2  =  x21Yl  +  x12 Y 2
(8)  W 2 =  w2(x 2 , T2)  Inverse Factor Supply  [-ka  +  )  D]y  +  [koe
-k2qnEl  -_  Tr)E2/D]-Y2
where p  is the  retail  price  of meat.  Equation  (3)  (19)  w I =  wl7'Y1  + w12'Y2
represents  retail  demand  for  meat.  Equilibrium  =  [-(E2 + klr  - k2'q)elD]Y^
conditions are specified in equation (4) by equating  +  [ - k2(0- +  ')e 2/D]Y2
price and  marginal cost.  Equations  (5) and  (6) are  (20)  w2 =  w2i'Y  +  i22Y2
output constrained input demand  functions,  which  =  [-k l (r  +  1q)e 1/D]y1 + [-(e1 +
can be  derived by  applying  Shephard's  lemma  so  k2o  - krl')e 2/D]Y 2
hl(wl,  w2)  =  aH/aw, and  h2(w,, w2)  =  aH/Iw 2. (21)  D  =  -ele 2 - klE16o  - k2e2ar  +  klle 2
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where  the  determinant  of  the Jacobian  matrix  is
D/elE2 . The only reason to introduce  D is  to sim-  (22a) CS  =  -p  + f/2l
plify  equations  (15)  through  (20) where  the  same  (23a) PS1 = kl(^v  - y  +  1/2Vll1 - 1 V/ly 1)
variables  are  repeated several  times.  The tilde  (')  (24a) PS 2 =  k2(w 2 - Y2  +  1/2w2-2  - 1/22fY2)
over  a variable  indicates  a derivative  with respectsion  for social welfare is formulated to
to  y,. For example,  q,  = dqldyl  and Xll  =  d.l  determine  optimal  rates  of technological  change.
dyl.  These  derivatives,  which  are  the  bracketed  This  formulation  of  social  welfare will  allow  for
terms  before  y1  and  y2,  will be  used  to  simplify  varying  welfare  weights  for  the  economic  sur-
subsequent notation.  pluses.  The  welfare  function  with  weights  is
p  .~Economic  Surplus  ,adopted  because public support of poultry research
declined  relative  to  beef  and  pork  after  poultry
became  integrated.  This  evidence  indicates  the The  distributional  consequences  of  technological  became  integrated.  This  evidence  indicates  the
change  will  be  addressed  in  this  section.  The  possibility  of  lower  welfare  weights  for  agri- change  will  be  addressed  in  this  section.  The businesses  relative  to  some  other  groups  in  the change in  consumer surplus  is the area under the  businesses  relative  to  some  other  groups  in  the
market. demand  curve  and  between  the  two  equilibrium  a  i 
prices,  with  and  without  technological  change  A  relative  measure  of  social  welfare  resulting prices,  with  and  without  technological  change  t  ic  n  i from  technological  change  can  be determined  by (Just,  et al.).  Lindner  and Jarrett reported that the  i 
summing  economic  surpluses and  subtracting  the type  of supply  shift,  which  results  from an  inno-  ecnoicurpluses  and  subtracting  the
vation,  would influence the magnitude of the ben- 
efit estimates.  However, Rose argued that it would  (25)  SW  =  CS  +  q 1PS,  +  02PS2
be virtually  impossible  to predict the type of sup-  - C(yl)-  2C 2(y2)
ply  shift that would  result from a particular  inno-
vation. Rose concluded that the only realistic strat-  where  W  =  dSW/pq  is a relative measure  of so-
egy is to assume the supply shift is parallel,  which  cial  welfare,  C,  is  a relative  measure  of cost for
makes a minor adjustment  for price response.  The  technological  change,  and  Oi  are  the  welfare
change  in consumer surplus (dCS) is given by the  weights,  indicating the relative importance  of each
following equation.  group  in the public  sector's decision-making  pro-
cess.  The welfare  weights  for consumers  and tax-
(22)  dCS  = pq(-p)(l  +  1/2)  payers  are normalized  at  1.0 for both groups.  The
The  change  in  producer  surplus  for  livestock  welfare  weight for livestock producers  (01)  can be
producers  (dPSI)  and  manufacturing  (dPS2)  are  varied depending  upon the  degree of market  inte-
given  by the following  equations.'  gration.  The welfare weight for manufacturing (02)
is applied to both the manufacturers'  producer sur-
(23)  dPS1 =  wlx 1(Vw'  - yt)(l  +  l/2ei)  plus,  PS2,  and  the  cost of  technological  change
(24)  dPS2 = w2x2(02  - Y2)(l  +  l/2x2)  financed by  the manufacturing  sector,  C2(y2).  To
Relative  measures  of  economic  surpluses  can  be  make the model of social welfare fully operational,
calculated by  dividing by market receipts, pq. For  a particular functional form has to be specified  for
example  CS  =  dCSlpq and PSi =  dPSi/pq.  the cost relationships  for technological  change.  A
quadratic  functional  form  is  assumed.  The  qua-
dratic  form indicates that the  cost of technological
In  a linear  model,  producer  surplus  (PS) can  be calculated  as fol-  change is increasing at an increasing rate, but mar-
lows:  ginal  cost  is  a  linear  function  of  technological
PS  = /2 (slope) X  change,  which  will  be  convenient  in  subsequent
where slope is the slope of the supply curve  and x  is the quantity of input  analysis.  The operational  model of social  welfare
used.  The change in producer surplus from technological change  can  be
calculated  by  subtracting  the  initial PS (without technological  change)  is  given by the  following relationship.
from the new  PS (with technological  change).
dPS  =  ½/2  slope  [(x  + dx)
2 -]  (25a)  SW  = CS  +  O1PSI  +  02PS2
For the comparative statics  model used in  this study, the expression  for  c  02C2 
slope is as follows:  A relative  measure  for change in profits  for man-
slope  = (-yw  + dw)/dx  ufacturing  is  determined  by  subtracting  costs  of
where  w is input price and y  is technological  change.  Substituting  this  technological change from  the relative measure of
definition of  slope into the  equation for  dPS and  simplifying yields:  producer  surplus:
dPS =  -ywx  +  xdw  - /2 ywdx  +  /2  dwdx.
Replace  dw  and dx  with these  relationships:  dw = wtw  and dx  =  xx.  (26)  *f 2 =  PS2  - 2(y 2)
With  these  substitutions,  this  relationship for  dPS can  be re-written  to
conform to  equations  (23)  and (24).  where  Tr 2 is d(profits)/pq,  with no change in fixedWhite  Agriculture and Technological Change  115
costs.  Assuming  a  quadratic  functional  form  for  analysis  will be  used  to  determine  the  impact  of
the  cost  of  technological  change,  the  relative  these parameters  on  the  optimal  level  of techno-
change  in  manufacturing  profits  is  given  by  the  logical change.
following equation.  There  are  two  non-cooperative  games  with  a
,  2  Nash equilibrium that are also of interest. First, the
(26a)  'r2  =  PS2 -c 2Y2 private sector would determine the optimal level of
Equation (26a) can also be thought of as a measure  technological change in manufacturing  (Y2),  while
of agribusiness  profits  without  integration  of the  the  public  sector  determines  the optimal  level of
two  input  sectors.  With  vertical  integration  of  technological change in production (yi).  This sce-
manufacturing  and  livestock  production,  the  con-  nario  does not include the  integration of manufac-
cept of agribusiness  profits  would be  extended  to  turing  and  livestock  production.  The  appropriate
include all producer surpluses:  derivatives  for this solution are given below.
(26b)  TT  = PSI  +  S2-  C 2y2 (29a)  dW/ldy1 = Ol0 +  otll'y  +  a 127Y 2 =  0
where Tr  is a relative measure of combined profits
for manufacturing  and livestock producers.  (29b)  dr 2/dy 2 =  o10  +  PI11'1  + 
312Y2  =  0
where  the  otl  and  ij are  shown in  Table  2.  The
Optimal Technological Change  first equation is the same as the earlier cooperative
game,  but  the  second  equation  is  different.  The
Using  the  framework  presented  in  the  previous  optimal  solutions  for this  alternative  are  reported
section,  research  policy choices  are  considered  as  below:
endogenous.  It  is  assumed  that  the  public  sector
funds technological  change  in production,  and the  (30a)  yb  =  (12a(10  - ot12l10)/(a11P12  - O 12311)
private  sector  funds  research  in  manufacturing.
Optimal  solutions  involve  decisions  by  both  the  b = (lo 
public  and  private  sectors.  A  game  theoretic  (30b)  Y2  (x3)/(3  -
framework is used to consider alternative strategies  where  yb is the  Nash equilibrium  prior to  integra-
of  the public  and  private  sectors.  First,  it  is  as-  tion.
sumed that the public and private sectors cooperate  The second Nash equilibrium  assumes  full inte-
to  maximize  global  welfare.  Secondly,  it  is  as-  gration of manufacturing and livestock production.
sumed that the public and private sectors determine  In this scenario,  agribusiness  considers changes  in
optimal  research  policies  in  a  non-cooperative  producer surpluses  in manufacturing  and livestock
Nash game,  assuming optimal policies by the other  production  in  determining  the  optimal  level  of
sector.  technological  change  financed by  the private  sec-
The  optimal  level  of  technological  change  to  tor.  The appropriate  derivatives  for  this  scenario
maximize  global  welfare  can be  found  by  taking  are given below.
the derivatives  of SW,  equation (25a),  with respect
to y1 and  Y2.  Setting these derivatives  equal to zero
gives the  following set of equations.  Table 2.  Parameter Expressions  for Social
(27a)  dSWldyl  =  alo  +  tY  IYj  +  C 12Y 2 =  0  Welfare and Agribusiness  Profits
(27b)  d  7WIdy 2 = a20 +  (Y 21Y 1 +  (Y227Y2  =  0  a1 =  -: 1 +  01 (kl1 1l  - kl)  + 02  (k2A 21)
011  =  -Plql +  01  (kll 1 1 pll  - klll)  + 02 (k 21iV 21 't21)
where the aiu are reported in Table 2. Solving these  - 2c  a12 =  -.12——142  - 1k'"ii'Vt 1 2 + ½"kjiPvI-I - ½2k 1 l2)
equations simultaneously yields the optimal values  2+  21 -(1/2k 2 l'w11g 2 2 +  /2k 2 12 2 w2 - l/2kl2)
for  y1  and 72  to maximize  social welfare.  a20 =  -p2  + 0  (klW12) + 02 (k 2i' 22 - k 2)
a21 =  -1/2P24 l - 1I/212  + 01  (l/2k1 i12xll  +
(28a)  y  =  (tx 22( 10 - (Ol 20 20)/(o(llOt22  - 1120l21)  l/2klw  -xl2  - 1/2kg 1 2) + 02  (/2k 2 V22i21  +
1/2k2w21x22  - l/2k2921)
(28b)  y2  =  (Oalla20  - 21lo)/(OLllOt22  - 0X12o21)  22 =  P 2 2 + 2)  +  (k 2ii22 - 2
where  ya is a cooperative  game  solution maximiz-  «o1  =  02 (k 21'22 - k 2) Ill  =  02 (/2k 21+ 22'f21 + 12k2!'v 21"22 - 1/2k2x21)
ing global  welfare (25a).  We  are interested in the  12  =  02 (k 2 22 - k 22 - 2c2)
derivatives of ya with respect to Tl, a,  Ki,  ei, and 0i. 20  =  1o  + 01  (kliw 2)
However,  these expressions are too complicated to  P 21 =  P11  + 01  (1/2kiwl2xul  +  1/2kiwlX 12 - 1/2klX12)
sign the  derivatives  by  inspection,  so  sensitivity  P 22 =  P 2 l1 (kiwlx 12)116  April 1995  Agricultural  and Resource Economics Review
(31a)  dSW/dyl  = Oclo  +  Otll'-  +  L12Y2  = 0  integrated  market  shows  the impact  of market in-
tegration  on technological  change.
(31b)  dfrldy2 =  320  +  P21Y1  +  322Y2  = 0  The model  is applied  to a hypothetical  livestock
market, with livestock production and manufactur-
where  the  oai  and  3ij are  shown  in  Table 2.  The  ing  equally  important.  The  base  parameters  are
first  equation  is  still the  same  as  the  cooperative  presented in Table  3.  Parameters  in the base solu-
game,  but the  second  equation  relates  to the pro-  tion include the elasticity of demand  (q  =  -. 7),
ducer  surplus  for  livestock  producers  and  manu-  the elasticity of substitution between livestock pro-
facturers.  The optimal solutions for this  alternative  duction  and manufacturing  (  =  .5); the  elastici-
are reported  below.  ties  of supply  for livestock  production  (El  =  .2)
and manufacturing (e2 =  .2);  and factor shares (k1 (32a)  yi  =  (122ta10  - ai 2P320)/(oall 22 - 0 12321)  =  =  5).  A related model for the beef sector is
given by Mullen,  Wohlgenant,  and  Farris.  Partic-
(32b)  y2  =  (Otll320  - P3210t1)/(CXllP 22 - 0t1 2121)  ular  attention  needs  to  be  focused  on  ci,  which
where  yc  is  a Nash equilibrium  after integration.  were chosen to yield a  1%  optimal rate of techno- where  ~c  is  a Nash equilibrium  after integration.
These  analytical  solutions  are  applied  in the  fol-  ogical  change  for the  base  solution  under global
lowing  section.  optimization  and 01  =  02  =  1. Research costs  by
the public  sector  [Cly 2 =  25  (.01)2  =  .0025  =
.25%]  would be  .25%  of aggregate  retail value to
produce  a  1%  technological  change  in  livestock
Sensitivity  Analysis  production. Likewise,  research costs by the private
sector  would  be  .25%  of aggregate retail value to
The  optimal  levels  of  technological  change  for  produce a 1% technological change in manufactur-
livestock  production  and  manufacturing  are  ana-  ing.
lyzed for  a set of base market parameters  and for  Agribusiness welfare  weights include only man-
selected changes in these parameters.  The analysis  ufacturing  in  the  nonintegrated  market,  but  they
for each  set of parameters  is repeated  for a nonin-  include livestock production and manufacturing  in
tegrated  and  an  integrated market.  A  comparison  the integrated market. Welfare weights are normal-
of the results for the nonintegrated  market  and the  ized  for consumers  and  taxpayers  at 1.0  in all sit-
Table  3.  Sensitivity  Analysis
Before Integration  After Integration
Agribusiness  =  (02)  A =  (0,  02)
Optimization Procedure  Welfare Weights  Y1*l  I12*1  \IY  \Y2*1
--------------------------  Percent  --------------------------
(1)  Base Parameters:  q  =-.7,  =  .5,  1 =  .2, e 2 =  .2,  kl  =  .5, k  =  .5,  c,  =  25., c 2 =  25.
Nash Equilibrium  1.0  1.00  .75  1.00  .78
Nash Equilibrium  .5  .98  .75  .61  .78
Global Optimization  .5  .98  1.26  .61  1.22
( 2)b  I =  -1.4
Nash Equilibrium  1.0  1.00  .80  1.00  .88
Nash Equilibrium  .5  .96  .80  .56  .88
Global  Optimization  .5  .96  1.21  .56  1.13
( 3)b (a =  1.0
Nash Equilibrium  1.0  1.00  .81  1.00  .78
Nash Equilibrium  .5  1.01  .81  .61  .78
Global Optimization  .5  1.01  1.20  .61  1.22
(4)b e,  =  .4
Nash Equilibrium  1.0  1.00  .75  1.00  .78
Nash Equilibrium  .5  .98  .75  .68  .78
Global Optimization  .5  .98  1.25  .68  1.23
(5)b E 2 =  .4
Nash Equilibrium  1.0  1.00  .60  1.00  .65
Nash Equilibrium  .5  .99  .60  .61  .65
Global Optimization  .5  .99  1.41  .61  1.36
'0A  is  a vector of weights  on social welfare  for agribusiness firms.  Before integration  agribusinesses  include only manufacturing
(input  2).  After integration  agribusinesses  include commodity  producers  (input  1),  as well  as manufacturing.
bScenarios  (2)-(5)  have  all base  parameters  with the  exception of one parameter  that has  been changed  as indicated.White  Agriculture and Technological Change  117
uations.  Considering  the information  on livestock  nological change.  Under  a Nash equilibrium,  IY21
and  poultry,  which  was  presented  earlier  in  the  =  .81% without integration  and IY 2 1 =  .78%  with
paper, it appears that the public sector may place a  integration.
lower  welfare  weight  on  the  agribusiness  sector.  Changing the supply elasticity for livestock pro-
That information  indicated  that  the public  sector  duction did not have  much impact  on the results,
support for poultry research  declined  in  a relative  but changing  the supply  elasticity for manufactur-
sense  after  market  integration.  To  reflect the  pos-  ing,  e2 =  .4,  makes a big difference.  The private
sibility of the public sector holding a lower welfare  sector's  support  of  technological  change  would
weight for agribusinesses,  the  sensitivity analysis  drop  IY21  =  .65%  relative to the base scenario 1Y 21
uses two  alternative  agribusiness  welfare weights:  =  .78%.  However,  society would want more pri-
O A =  1 and 0A  =  .5  where (0,, 02)  = (1,  0A) prior  vate  sector  support,  IY21  =  1.36%  compared  to
to integration  and  (09, 02)  =  (0A,  OA)  after  inte-  1.22%  under the  base  scenario.  These results  in-
gration.  dicate the more elastic the supply of manufacturing
With  the base  set  of parameters  and 
0A  =  1,  inputs,  the  greater  divergence  between  what  the
global optimization  would yield  1%  technological  private  sector  does  (Nash  equilibrium)  and  what
change in both livestock production and  manufac-  society  wants the  private  sector to  do  (global op-
turing; (this standardized solution is not reported in  timization).
the  table).  A  non-cooperative  Nash  equilibrium
with these weights and 
0A  =  1 would reduce man-
ufacturing technological  change,  1Y21,  from  1.0 to  Conclusions
.75 without market integration.  Market integration
would have increased manufacturing  technological
change,  Iy21,  from .75 to .78.  The more interesting  Poultry  is  heavily  integrated  and  pork  is  rapidly
and  more  realistic  scenario  is 
0 A  =  .5.  In  this  becoming integrated.  Other livestock sectors  may
case,  the  global  optima  differ  between  pre-  and  be integrated  in the near future.  This type  of inte-
post-integration  scenarios,  because  in  the  post-  gration or industrialization  has  important implica-
integration  scenario  the  agribusiness  welfare  tions  for technological  change.  The  public  sector
weight  applies  to  livestock  producer  surplus,  as  reduced its  support for poultry research relative to
well  as  manufacturing  producer  surplus.  Without  beef and  pork  after  the  integration  of  poultry.  It
integration,  the  public sector desires  (global opti-  appears  likely that the public sector will reduce  its
mization)  a sizable increase in manufacturing tech-  support for technological change in integrated mar-
nological  change,  IY21,  of  1.26%,  but the  private  kets.  On  the  surface,  this  strategy  appears  to  be
sector would increase  IY21  only .75%  under a Nash  rational if society values the welfare of consumers,
equilibrium.  After  integration  the  public  sector's  taxpayers,  and/or producers higher than the profits
contribution  to livestock  production  technological  of agribusinesses.
change,  ly1l,  would  be  only  .61%,  but  it would  Optimal  rates  of  technological  change  were
want the private  sector  to  support  1Y21  at  1.22%.  identified  under  a  cooperative  game  with  global
However,  the private sector would most likely  op-  optimization.  This  approach  identifies  the  best
erate  as  a  Nash  equilibrium  with  IY 21 =  .78%.  strategy  for  technological  change  from  society's
First,  these results indicate that market integration  perspective.  However,  the most likely private sec-
results  in  a  lower  level  of  technological  change  tor  behavior  would  be  consistent  with  a  non-
supported  by  the public  sector than  without  inte-  cooperative  game,  Nash equilibrium. Results from
gration.  Secondly,  the private  sector supports  less  the  sensitivity  analysis  indicated  that  the  private
technological change than what would be desirable  sector's  support of  technological  change  is  often
from society's perspective,  quite different than what would be best from soci-
If demand  is more elastic,  I  =  -1.4,  the pri-  ety's perspective.
vate  sector  would  support  more  technological  Society does not get the optimal results in tech-
change,  IY 21 =  .80% compared to  .75%  under the  nological  change that  it would  desire  by reducing
base  scenario.  However,  the public  sector  would  its level  of research  funding after  market  integra-
support a lower level of technological  change with  tion.  Left  alone  the  private  sector  will  not  ade-
market  integration,  Iyll  =  .56%  compared  to  quately  support  technological  change  from  soci-
.61%  under the base  scenario.  ety's  perspective.  The  public  sector  will need  to
If the  elasticity  of substitution  is higher,  cr  =  encourage  more private  sector  support for techno-
1.0, there is  a reversal in the impact of integration  logical  change  with  industrialization  of  agricul-
on  the  private  sector  support  for  technological  ture.  The public  sector  might emphasize  research
change.  In  this  case,  market  integration  would  such  as  basic  science  that  complements  and  sup-
cause a reduction in private sector support for tech-  ports private  sector research.118  April 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
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